Should Pricing Policies be Regulated when Firms may Tacitly Collude? by George Norman & Jacques-François Thisse
Should Pricing Policies be Regulated when









Université Catholique de Louvain,





Active antitrust policy may result in perverse effects detrimental to consumer and social welfare because such
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prices. By contrast, if the consumer reservation price is binding, the welfare properties of the two pricing policies
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concentration is already high, deregulation of pricing policies is less likely to benefit consumers unless the
regulatory authorities are willing to impose accompanying restrictions intended to reduce price flexibility.
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1.  Introduction
Regulation of the conditions under which firms compete is common in the majority of
Western industrialized countries. Such regulation is intended to prevent or control, for example,
explicit or tacit collusion among firms, mergers and acquisitions, vertical restraints and firms’
pricing policies, in particular whether firms can employ discriminatory pricing. The common
rationale for these regulatory policies is that they are needed to protect consumers from the abuse
of monopoly power by firms that supply them with goods and services.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that care should be exercised by antitrust
authorities in their design of policies intended to promote competition in the marketplace. We do
not deny the underlying “raison d'être” of competition policy but wish to suggest that naive
application of the idea that competition is always and everywhere desirable may have unforeseen
and harmful effects. Our analysis can be summarized by the proposition that analysis of the effects
of competition policy should not take industry structure as given. Policies that create too tough a
competitive environment may result in perverse effects detrimental to consumer and social welfare
because active antitrust policy affects market structure through its impact on the medium- and
long-run decisions of firms. The stronger are the structural effects of regulatory policy the more
likely is it that blind adherence by the regulatory authorities to the benefits of competition will be
misguided.
As a simple illustration, consider the case for cartel laws. The received wisdom has been
that a high degree of coordination among firms benefits them through high profits but is
detrimental to consumers through high prices, the losses of consumers generally outweighing the
gains of producers. This line of reasoning underpinned the tough anti-trust and merger policy that
characterized regulation in the United States and European until the early 1980s. The desirability
and acceptability of such tough policy has, however, been questioned on several grounds.
Williamson (1968), for example, has argued that efficiency considerations may be grounds for
defending coordination among firms if such coordination allows them to perform cost-saving
activities, the benefits of which outweigh the price-increasing or quantity-reducing effects of
coordination.
1
                                               
1  German law allows "rationalization" and "specialization" cartels on the grounds that they lead to
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Selten (1984) develops an argument that is more closely related to the ideas we develop in
this paper. He shows that if the market within which cartel laws are being enacted is characterized
by free entry “joint profit maximization permits a greater number of competitors in a market than
non-collusive behavior.” (p. 183)  As a consequence “cartel laws are good for business in the
sense of greater average joint profits.” (p. 214)
Our focus in this paper is on the regulation of firms’ pricing policies, which was widely
accepted up to the early 1980's to be in the public interest. Norman and Thisse (1996) provide
several examples of such regulation: of the prices charged by US and European airline industries,
the application of resale price maintenance, the policies articulated by the UK Price Commission
and the Federal Trade Commission in the US attacking discriminatory pricing. In a related
context, the 1980s saw increasingly strict application by the US and Europe of anti-dumping
legislation (dumping can be viewed as price discrimination in the international market-place). For
example, from 1980 to 1987 the EC ruled against foreign firms in 249 cases affecting some three
billion ECUs of imports (Tharakan 1991, Table 1).
This relatively tough regulatory regime has been considerably relaxed over the past
decade. The Robinson-Patman Act has not been applied in the US, the Price Commission was
abolished in the UK, and more generally firms have been left freer to choose their pricing policies,
as a result of which (spatial) discriminatory pricing is a more likely outcome (Thisse and Vives,
1988).
Justification for the relaxation in policy can be found in modern developments in spatial
pricing which argue that spatial price discrimination may be better for consumers than mill pricing:
see, for example, Norman (1983), Thisse and Vives (1988). The way the argument runs is that
discriminatory pricing is tougher for firms than mill pricing and so is pro- rather than anti-
competitive:
"denying a firm the right to meet the price of a competitor on a discriminatory basis
provides the latter with some protection against price attacks. The effect is then to weaken
competition, contrary to the belief of the proponents of naive application of legislation
prohibiting price discrimination like the Robinson-Patman Act, or similar
recommendations of the Price Commission in the United Kingdom." (Thisse and Vives,
1988)                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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It is of interest to note, for example, that discriminatory prices can be defended against action
under the Robinson-Patman Act or international anti-dumping legislation if they are intended to
"meet the competition".
The benefits claimed for discriminatory pricing have been called into question in recent
analyses by Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and Norman and Thisse (1996). The common theme
of these works is that current policy-based analysis is flawed because it takes no account of an
important feedback loop between market conduct and market structure.
2   If discriminatory
pricing is, indeed, more competitive for incumbent firms it will act as an entry deterrent. As a
result, the essentially short-run benefits that the more competitive regime generates through lower
prices may be more than offset by the longer-run effects it has on market structure: by reducing in
the number of firms that wish to enter the market or the scale at which they enter.
Our specific contribution in this paper is that we extend the Norman/Thisse analysis by
relaxing an important assumption: that post-entry prices are one-shot Bertrand equilibrium prices.
We consider, instead, the situation in which the incumbent firms recognize that the price game is a
repeated game. Before turning to this analysis, we develop some further preliminary ideas in the
next section. Our formal model is then presented in section 3 and the price equilibria for this
model are identified in section 4. Section 5 presents a welfare comparison of the two pricing
policies and our main conclusions are summarized in section 6.
2. Some Preliminary Analysis
Let us try to make the ideas presented above more concrete by examining how we might
structure a general case capable of identifying the supposed benefits of tough regulatory policies.
Assume that a market (as defined for policy purposes) contains N active firms, where N is to be
determined endogenously through some entry and/or exit process. The pay-off to each firm is a
function of two sets of variables:
(i) a set R describing the regulatory regime within which the firms operate. R may be
determined by Government, for example describing the class of acceptable pricing policies
or the toughness of antitrust policy, or by (a subset of) the incumbent firms, for example,
                                               
2  Armstrong and Vickers consider a situation in which a monopolist serves two markets, one of which is
captive and the other subject to the threat of entry by a price-taking entrant.  They show that entry is more likely
and the scale of entry is larger when price discrimination is banned.  Norman and Thisse consider a free-entry
Salop-style market and show that price discrimination may inhibit entry sufficiently as to be against the interests of
consumers and society.  See d'Aspremont and Motta (1997) for a model in a related vein.                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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specifying “orderly” pricing regimes such as basing point pricing; consumer incentives;
price-matching guarantees.
(ii) a set P of strategic variables chosen by the firms more or less non-cooperatively: prices,
product specifications; locations; quantities.
A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in N and P is identified from some m-stage game. For
a given regulatory regime R, this equilibrium specifies a pay-off to each firm of the form:
(1) ( ) ( ) P i P N N R
* * * * , : for i = 1,...N*
which will have associated welfare properties.  Now consider alternative regulatory regimes,
where we define a “tougher” regime  $ R R
t
f  as being a regime that is more competitive for the
firms in, or contemplating entry to the market. For example, assume that the regulatory authority
tries to promote fierce competition in this market by abolishing facilitating practices, or outlawing
the trade association to avoid contacts among the firms, or warning the firms that they are
suspected of collusive behavior. For a given N it is to be expected that:
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) P P i i P N N R P N N R
* * * * < , : $ , : if  $ R R
t
f
with the reduction in profit (partially) transferred to consumers. Equation (2) would appear to
justify governments’ preference for tough rather than soft regulatory regimes.
However, equation (2) is essentially short-run, in that it takes market structure as given. It
is also to be expected that increased toughness of the regulatory regime will reduce the number of
active firms in the market in the medium- and long-run. When firms have to decide whether to
renew plants or to update their products or to incur other fixed costs, it may be that the decreased
future stream of expected profits will not cover these costs. The exit of some firms is to be
expected, increasing profitability for the remaining firms in the market:
3
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) R N N P R N N P i i : , : , 2 2 1 1
* * * * P < P if N1 > N2
The overall effect of an increase in the toughness of the regulatory regime is a combination
of (2) and (3) and might be expressed as follows. Let DR > 0 be some measure of increased
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In other words, increased toughness of R has:
(a) a profit reducing effect in the short run through its impact on P for a given N, and
(b) a profit increasing effect in the longer run through induced exit and stronger entry deterrence.
For increased toughness to benefit consumers (a) must dominate (b). Otherwise increased
market concentration will make consumers worse off, for example through reduced product
variety or a longer travel distance to shops, and more generally through higher prices. Note the
similarity between this analysis and Selten’s argument that collusion may lead to lower
concentration and lower total profits in an industry. A qualitatively similar conclusion would be
reached if our measure of the desirability of changes in R were some weighted average of
producer and consumer surplus.
4  In short, policy that establishes too tough a competitive
environment may have some unforeseen effects with the (apparently) paradoxical result of being
detrimental to the community's welfare.
An important limitation of almost all current analysis is that the equilibrium of the post-
entry subgame, on whatever strategic variables it is based, is assumed to be the outcome of a one-
shot game. This, as we shall show, is an important assumption. If price, for example, is the
strategic variable, discriminatory pricing is, indeed, more competitive than non-discriminatory
(referred to hereafter as mill) pricing in spatial markets, or their non-spatial analogs, precisely
because the prices that emerge are the result of a Bertrand-at-every point process. But if the price
subgame is repeated it is not at all clear that the same conclusion will hold.
We know that a monopolist always prefers discriminatory pricing to mill pricing and it
might be expected that the same will be true when the prices charged by firms correspond to a
tacitly collusive outcome for an infinitely repeated price subgame.
5 Assume, for example, as we
do in the remainder of our analysis, the familiar Hotelling/Salop spatial model in which consumer
demand is perfectly inelastic for prices below some reservation price. With demand of this type it
                                                                                                                                                      
3  A possible exception would be if there were extensive network externalities between firms.
4  There are further considerations that we do not consider in this paper.  For example, price discrimination
facilitates market segmentation by multi-product firms, increasing prices and profits but reducing consumer
surplus.                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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trivially follows from the Folk Theorem that a set of discriminatory prices arbitrarily close to the
consumers’ reservation price will be subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) prices for some discount
factor sufficiently close to unity. Consequently, these prices will be higher than the SPE mill prices
almost everywhere even if market structure is endogenously determined.
It would appear, in other words, that the “endogenous market structure” argument is
irrelevant to the choice of allowable pricing practices once we introduce the possibility that firms
are aware that they are in competition over time and incorporate this into their pricing decisions.
But this overlooks the importance of a crucial part of the argument: that the discount factor be
“sufficiently close to unity”. The question we need to investigate is how close the discount factor
must be to unity for a particular set of discriminatory or mill prices to be sustainable as an SPE.
This question arises from the nature of SPE prices. These are sustained through some credible
punishment strategy which is designed to ensure that the short-term gains from deviating from the
(tacitly) agreed prices are more than offset by the long-term losses that will be incurred once the
punishment phase is implemented. Looking at this another way, the ability to raise prices above
their Bertrand-Nash equilibrium levels is constrained by the potential gains a firm will make by
deviating from these prices. Such gains are likely to vary significantly with different pricing
policies and so will impose different limits on the SPE prices. This suggests that we might
approach the problem from a somewhat different perspective by asking: For a given discount
factor, what is the upper limit on the discriminatory and mill prices that firms can charge? We can
then investigate the welfare properties of these prices.
Two other remarks are in order at this stage. First, the punishment strategy on which we
focus in this paper is what is sometimes referred to as a "grim trigger strategy": any deviation
from the tacitly agreed prices induces reversion to the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices
forever. Other punishments are available to firms but it is reasonable to suggest that the
qualitative properties of our analysis would remain valid for a larger class of such alternative
strategies.
Secondly, it will be shown below that the discount factor is an amalgam of the discount
rate, which is largely outside the control of regulators (and firms), and firms' price flexibility in
response to deviation by their rivals, which is potentially controllable by regulators. Under what
                                                                                                                                                      
5  We can assume the price subgame to be infinitely repeated or to be repeated with some known, constant                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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circumstances (if any) might the authorities wish to impose controls on the speed with which firms
can change their prices? Our analysis, in other words, introduces a further important element to
regulatory control that has not been much discussed, primarily because the currently available
analysis is static. The dynamic approach followed here brings with it a new dimension of
competition in that the discount factor can be made endogenous to the market.
We show that, provided consumers’ reservation prices impose no effective constraints on
firms, the upper limits on the tacitly agreed prices are such that discriminatory prices are almost
always and almost everywhere lower than mill prices. In other words, consumers gain and firms
lose from discriminatory pricing. The ease with which firms can revise their location decisions (the
degree of spatial contestability), which was central to the welfare properties of our 1996 analysis,
now has a more limited role. Firms gain less and consumers lose less from mill pricing when the
market is spatially non-contestable.
We also show, however, that explicit account must be taken of the consumer reservation
price since this imposes a more severe constraint on mill prices than on discriminatory prices. If
this constraint is strong enough and if pricing decisions are flexible enough, the welfare properties
of the two pricing policies will be reversed with consumers losing and firms gaining from
discriminatory pricing. The required degree of price flexibility for this to happen is lower in more
concentrated market structures. This implies that if market concentration is already high,
deregulation of pricing policies is less likely to benefit consumers unless the regulatory
authorities are willing to impose accompanying restrictions intended to reduce price flexibility.
3. The Model
We conduct our analysis in the context of the Hotelling/Salop location model, in which the
economy is assumed to be a circle C over which consumers are uniformly distributed at unit
density. The interpretation of this model as a model of horizontal product differentiation is now so
familiar that we need not repeat it here.
We assume that each time period t is g units long, where g measures the speed of response
of incumbent firms to any perceived price deviation, and that the continuous rate of time discount
is r. Firms entering this market offer products that are identical in all characteristics but their
locations. Production costs in any period t are assumed to be identical for all firms, given by:
                                                                                                                                                      




t) = f + cQ
t
where f can be thought of as the flow-equivalent present value of set-up costs -- if aggregate set-
up costs are F, then 
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0 -- c are marginal costs and Q
t is total output
of the firm in period t. Thus production exhibits economies of scale, limiting the number of firms
that will wish to enter the market. We assume that f is sufficiently small for us to be able to ignore
integer problems and we normalize c = 0 without loss of generality.
The set N = {1,2,...n,...} denotes all potential entrants and the set ￿ denotes the firms that
actually choose to enter.
6  Each firm chooses a location xi ˛ C ¨ F, where xi ˛ C if firm i
chooses to enter the market and xi = F otherwise. This entry stage establishes a location
configuration denoted by the vector x = (xi) in which we assume that the set ￿ corresponds to
the first #(￿) elements of x. It will prove convenient below to refer to the time-dependent
location configuration x
t, where, unless otherwise stated, it is to be expected that x
t = x for all t =
1...¥.
Firms are assumed to make their pricing decisions after they have made their
entry/location decisions. In each post-entry period t, each firm i ˛ ￿ establishes the price
schedule  ( ) p r i
t t x  giving its delivered price to each consumer location r ˛ C. Transport costs are
assumed to be linear in distance and quantity transported with transport rate s, so that with mill
pricing the delivered price schedule for firm i in period t is:




i x = + - " i ˛ ￿, r ˛ C.
With discriminatory pricing we assume only that firms never price below marginal costs:
(7) ( ) p r s x r i
t t
i x ‡ - " i ˛ ￿, r ˛ C
and we normalize s = 1 without loss of generality. The firms’ pricing decisions made in each
period are denoted by the vector  ( ) ( ) { } p x x
t t
i
t t p r = , i ˛ ￿, and  ( ) P
t
i
t x , i ˛ ￿, denotes the set









                                               
6  This implies that all firms make their entry decisions simultaneously.  In the analysis that follows we shall
concentrate upon entry processes that lead to the loosest packing of firms consistent with the relocation costs that                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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Consumers purchase from the firm offering the product at the lowest delivered price.  If
there is a price tie, we assume that consumers act in a socially optimal manner by purchasing from
the nearest firm. Consumer demand is perfectly inelastic at prices below a reservation price v, with
demand to firm i ˛ ￿ from consumers at location r given by:







t t s x x x










The per-period rate of profit to firm i ˛ ￿ is:
(9) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
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where d = e
-gr is the discount factor, with 0 < d < 1. The discounted present value of firm i is:







Since the discount factor d is determined by both g and r it can be taken as a measure of price
flexibility in the relevant market which, as we noted in section 2, is potentially controllable by the
regulatory authorities. In other words, the discount factor can be made endogenous to the market
by the regulator.
In analyzing equilibrium in this market we distinguish between the initial entry stage and
subsequent periods in which incumbent firms can take explicit account of the repeated nature of
price competition between them. Since in these later periods “profits will normally be shared on
the basis of market areas ... we may expect the process by which market areas are determined to
be a very aggressive one.” (MacLeod et al., 1987, p. 192). Specifically, we assume that market
areas are determined by a two-stage entry/price game in which equilibrium for the price-subgame
is Bertrand-Nash. This is defined in the usual way as the set of price functions  ( ) p x b
t t  such that
for all i ˛ ￿:




i ib p x p x x x p x
t
b




t t ˛ .
Denote  ( ) ( ) s x p x b
t t
b
t t = , .
                                                                                                                                                      
firms might incur. As a result, we could equivalently think of the entry process as being sequential provided that                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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Equilibrium for the first stage entry game is a location configuration x such that:








i , , , , ‡ - - "  x C i ˛ ¨ F  and i ˛ N.
We follow a well-established tradition and confine our attention to location configurations in
which incumbent firms are symmetrically located on C.
Once firms’ market areas have been determined by this entry/price process the identities of
the incumbent firms are known and it becomes possible for them to coordinate their pricing
decisions to reflect the repeated nature of the price game in which they are now involved. We can
relabel as t = 0 the beginning of the post-entry repeated price game. Given the equilibrium
( ) ( ) x p x b
t ,  identified by (11) and (12), it is always possible to find a set of prices  { } ~ ~ p = pi  for i ˛
N such that ( ) ( ) ( ) p p i
t
i
t x p x p x b
t ,~ , ‡ .  MacLeod et al. (1987) show that the pricing strategy:

















t t t x x x x x p p if or and for some 0
otherwise
t t t 1
is a subgame perfect equilibrium pricing strategy provided that:




p i i i
i
p x p x p x x p b
t , ~ , max , ,~ - ‡ - - 1 .
Equation (14) ensures that deviation from the prices  ~ p  is not profitable for any incumbent
firm, while the initial entry process and the pricing strategy (13) guarantee that new entrants will
not be attracted to the market. MacLeod et al. do not identify what the prices  ~ p  might be and it
is to this question that we now turn.
4. Price Equilibrium in the Repeated Price Game
In determining the prices  ~ p  we need to identify first, the “shape” of the firms’ delivered
price schedules and secondly, their one-period profit-maximizing deviation from these prices. We
simplify the analysis by assuming that at the entry stage each firm is committed to a particular
pricing policy.  In the non-discriminatory case, this implies that all firms are committed to mill
pricing whether or not they abide by the agreed prices.
7 If the firms adopt discriminatory pricing,
                                                                                                                                                      
the post-entry price game is played non-cooperatively until the entry process has been completed.
7  This implies that with mill pricing the consumers control collection of the goods.  In the product
differentiation analogy, it implies that the deviating firm is committed at the entry stage to a specialized technology
that cannot produce a range of differentiated products.                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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we assume that they are committed to a uniform delivered pricing policy.
8  It should be clear that
the optimal one-period deviation from a tacitly agreed uniform delivered price is a uniform
delivered price.
Assume for the moment that the market is of unit length
9 and that it contains n
symmetrically located firms, that no further entry is possible and that the consumer reservation
price is sufficiently high or the number of firms sufficiently great that firms are in the competitive
regions of their demand curves (Salop 1979). For the moment we can suppose the no-entry
condition to be determined either exogenously by institutional constraints or endogenously as the
result of the free-entry process we have detailed in section 3.
4.1 Mill Pricing
The free-entry Bertrand-Nash equilibrium mill prices are:
(15) m n i
b =1 ,  i = 1...n.
After the entry stage has been completed we assume that the firms reach a tacit agreement on a
set of mill prices  ~ ~ m m n i
a = , i = 1...n, with instantaneous flow profits to each firm inclusive of
fixed costs of:
(16) pi
a m n = ~ 2 i = 1...n.
We wish to identify the highest mill prices  ( ) ~ mi
a d  which can be an SPE for the discount
factor d. As we have noted, these prices must exactly balance the one-period rewards from
cheating on the agreed prices against the long-term losses when such deviation is punished.  The
punishment phase is easily defined: we assume that firms revert to the one-shot Bertrand-Nash
prices of equation (15) forever. If firm i decides to deviate from the tacitly agreed prices more
complex considerations arise.  In particular, firm i must decide how many of its neighboring firms
it will undercut (stealing their entire markets).
It is convenient to use the following definition.
                                               
8  This is not unreasonable given our assumption that demand is perfectly inelastic for all prices less than
the reservation price v.  In the production differentiation analog, the uniform pricing assumption implies that all
firms are committed to charging the same price for all of the product variants they offer.  It is interesting to note
that Ford Motor Company, for example, is increasingly employing this type of pricing policy over parts of the
product spectrum that they feel to be reasonably distinct.
9  This normalization does not affect the analysis so long as the consumer reservation price is non-binding.
We shall relax this assumption in section 4.2 when we consider  the effects of a binding reservation price.                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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(D)  Let h(d) = 
( )
2 1 3 3 1
2 1
2 d d d
d
- + - +
-
 and define j|[d]| to be the smallest integer j
greater than h(d).
Note that j|[d]| is increasing in d.
We can show (see the Mathematical Appendix) that if firm i deviates from the agreed
prices it will do so in such a way that it undercuts exactly j|[d]| neighboring firms on each side.
Firm i will not, however, set prices such that it undercuts j|[d]| neighbors and takes part of the
markets of the (j|[d]| + 1)th neighbors.  We then have the following:
Proposition 1:
10  The highest mill price that can be an SPE for the repeated price game when the
market contains n symmetrically located firms, no further entry is possible and the
discount factor is d is:
(17) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
~ min ,
|[ ]| |[ ]| |[ ]| |[ ]|
|[ ]| |[ ]|
m v
n




d d d d d
d d d
= -

















where j|[d]| is defined by (D) and is such that 1 < j|[d]|  < n/2.
It is easy to show, as we would expect,
11 that  ( ) ¶ d ¶d ~ mi
a > 0. The upper limit on the SPE mill




12 that provided no firm has monopoly power in any segment of its market area
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium discriminatory pricing schedule for each entrant is:




￿ - - = r x r x r p j j i
b
i min , max x , i = 1...n.
Now assume that after the entry stage has been completed the firms tacitly agree each to charge a
uniform delivered price ~ u . As with discriminatory pricing, we wish to identify the highest uniform
                                               
10  Proofs of all propositions are given in the Mathematical Appendix.
11  This is most easily done numerically since, for any given n, the mill price is a function only of d.
12  See, for example, Gee (1976), Lederer and Hurter (1986).                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
14
delivered prices  ( ) ~ ui
a d  that can be an SPE for the discount factor d. Once again, these have to
balance reward and punishment, where now equation (18) gives the prices that will apply forever
in the event of cheating. With discriminatory pricing it is easy to identify the best possible
deviation for firm i: price should be reduced marginally below the tacitly agreed uniform delivered
price  ( ) ~ ui
a d , giving the cheating firm a market area of  ( ) ( ) ~ ~ u s u i
a
i
a d d =  with our normalization s
= 1.  We then have:
Proposition 2: The highest uniform delivered price that can be an SPE when the market contains



























As with the mill price,  ( ) ¶ d ¶d ~ ui
a > 0: the upper limit on the uniform delivered price is an
increasing function of the discount factor (or the degree of price flexibility).
5.  The Welfare Effects of Deregulating Firms’ Pricing Policies
The analysis of the previous section identifies upper limits on the prices that firms can
charge but we know from the Folk Theorem that any prices between these upper limits and the
Bertrand-Nash prices can be sustained as equilibrium prices for the relevant discount factor d.
This makes welfare comparison of the alternative pricing policies impossible without the
imposition of some further structure on the model. The approach we adopt is to assume that self-
interest among the incumbent firms leads them to settle on the highest possible prices that can be
charged consistent with there being no incentive to deviate. In other words, for the remainder of
this paper, we assume that equations (17) and (19) describe the actual prices that will be charged
by the incumbent firms after the entry stage has been completed.
A very simple result characterizes the comparison of discriminatory and mill prices for the
one-shot price subgame, as illustrated by Figure 1. If there are n active firms with each pricing
policy as in Figure 1(a) no consumer loses from discriminatory pricing. By contrast, if there are n                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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active firms with mill pricing but only n/2 with discriminatory pricing as in Figure 1(b) no
consumer gains from discriminatory pricing.
(Figure 1 near here)
It turns out that a similar property holds for the SPE prices of equations (17) and (19).
Proposition 3:  Assume that the reservation price is not binding and that there are n  active firms
with mill pricing.




n n d d
= = < " ‡ 2 : If there are also n  active firms with discriminatory
pricing, all consumers gain from discriminatory pricing.
(ii)  If no consumer is to gain from discriminatory pricing, there will have to be no
more than n /2 firms with discriminatory pricing.
These are actually stronger results than for the one-shot price subgame. It would appear
that the advantage to consumers of discriminatory pricing relative to mill pricing is even greater
with the repeated price game. This might on first sight seem surprising since, as Figure 1(a) makes
clear, the punishment phase with discriminatory pricing is much more severe than with mill
pricing. The reason is to be found in the very different rewards that accrue to price-undercutting
with the two pricing policies. When firms employ mill pricing, a firm that wishes to cut price to
one set of consumers must also offer reduced prices to all of its existing customers, dissipating at
least some of the benefits of the reduced prices. A price-cutting firm suffers no such loss of
revenue with discriminatory pricing since prices to its existing customers are maintained
effectively unchanged, strengthening the temptation to cut prices. The need to offset the one-
period gains to price-cutting imposes a sufficiently strong constraint on the tacitly agreed
discriminatory prices as to lead to Proposition 3.
In order to extend our comparisons of the two pricing policies we need to be more precise
about the outcome of the entry stage detailed in section 3. A key property that affects entry,
market structure and so the effects of price deregulation is the degree of spatial contestability.
When incumbents can relocate their activities costlessly the industry is defined to be spatially
contestable (SC). At the other extreme, if relocation costs are prohibitive, making location choice
once-for-all, the industry is defined to be spatially non-contestable (SNC).                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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In a free-entry equilibrium with SC each entrant firm just breaks even. We take as the free-
entry SNC equilibrium the loosest packing of firms consistent with there being no further entry.
At this equilibrium the incumbents fully exploit the entry-deterring advantage of being committed
to their locations. As a result, the free entry number of entrants is:
13
(20)
( ) ( )
( )
( )

































Since n n d f
• • > 1 2 we cannot conclude that the entry-deterring effect of discriminatory pricing
more than offsets its pro-competitive benefits for consumers. We must, therefore, turn to more
aggregate comparisons. In doing so, it turns out that we must also distinguish between cases in
which the reservation price is not binding and those in which it is.
5.1 Welfare Comparisons: Non-Binding Consumer Reservation Price
Throughout this subsection we shall assume that the consumer reservation price imposes
no effective constraint on firms’ prices. The complex nature of the price equilibria makes
analytical results difficult to derive. However, given equations (17), (19) and (20), set-up costs
appear as a common multiplier provided that the consumer reservation price is not binding. As a
result, all comparisons are determined by the discount factor d and numerical comparisons provide
a complete description of the relative merits of the two pricing policies.  Recall that d = e
-gr, with
the result that, for a given continuous rate of time discount, d will be greater the faster the speed
of response of incumbents (the lower is g). Figure 2 and Table 1 summarize the welfare effects of
the two pricing policies. In Table 1 we also repeat our results for the one-shot price subgame to
facilitate comparison.
Consider, first, the impact of pricing policy on delivered prices (Figure 2(a)).  If the
market is SC every consumer is better off with discriminatory pricing for any discount factor
greater than 0.5 and if the market is SNC every consumer is better off with discriminatory
pricing provided the discount factor is greater than 0.601.  The benefits to consumers of the pro-
competitive effects of discriminatory prices with a given market structure extend to endogenous
                                               
13  See Norman and Thisse (1996) for a detailed discussion of these results.  The subscript d denotes
discriminatory pricing and the subscript f denotes mill (or fob) pricing.                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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market structures when prices are determined by equations (17) and (19).  Discriminatory pricing
increases market concentration and so increases prices (which is why the difference between the
mill price and uniform delivered price is lower when the market is SNC). However, this is more
than offset by the need to make price-undercutting unprofitable which, as we have already
indicated, imposes a stronger constraint on pricing when firms employ discriminatory pricing.
The impact of discriminatory pricing on aggregate consumer surplus is straightforward. If
firms’ total revenue is denoted TR(n) and aggregate consumer surplus is denoted CS(n) then it
follows from our definition of individual consumer demand that CS(n) = v - TR(n). From Figure
2(b) mill pricing generates higher total revenues and so lower aggregate consumer surplus than
discriminatory pricing no matter the degree of spatial contestability. This is in contrast to the
one-shot price subgame, in which mill pricing benefits consumers if the market is SNC. When the
price subgame is repeated, the ability of firms to raise prices when they employ a mill pricing
policy is sufficiently strengthened that, no matter the degree of spatial contestability, consumers
unambiguously benefit from discriminatory prices.
Now consider the impact of pricing policy on profitability (Figure 2(c)). If the market is
SC (SNC) mill (discriminatory) pricing gives greater supernormal profits to the individual firm.
14
Individual firm profitability with the two pricing policies is determined by the interplay between
the price-reducing and entry-deterring effects of allowing firms to employ a discriminatory pricing
policy. If the market is SC the price-reducing effect is dominant.  By contrast, if the market is
SNC equations (20) indicate that the entry-deterring effect of price deregulation is strengthened.
This is sufficient, at the individual firm level, to offset the profit-reducing effects of fiercer price
competition.
(Figure 2 and Table 1 near here)
Such ambiguity does not characterize aggregate profits: Figure 2(d).  Aggregate profit is
greater with mill pricing than discriminatory pricing no matter the degree of spatial
contestability. This is in sharp contrast to our analysis of SNC with a one-shot price subgame: see
Table 1. The difference derives once again from our discussion of Proposition 3 in which we saw
                                               
14  There is a slight exception to this.  With SC the difference in profits between mill and discriminatory
pricing is a series of quadratics, one for each value of j.  Each such quadratic has a turning point at the discount
factor d(j) = 4j
2/(4j
2 + 4j -1) at which individual profits are equal for the two types of firm.                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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that the competitive disadvantage of discriminatory pricing is strengthened when the price
subgame is repeated.
The comparison of total surplus is just as in Norman and Thisse (1996). If total costs are
TC(n) then total surplus is v - TC(n). Since the entry process we have assumed is independent of
the nature of the post-entry price subgame, total costs are also independent of the nature of the
post-entry price subgame.  If the market is SNC (SC) mill pricing will generate higher (lower)
total surplus than discriminatory pricing.
To summarize, when the price subgame is repeated and the consumer reservation price is
non-binding, discriminatory prices benefit consumers almost always individually and always in the
aggregate while mill prices benefit producers in the aggregate (and individually if the market is
SC). Although the impact of discriminatory prices on aggregate surplus is determined by the
degree of spatial contestability when consumer surplus and producer surplus are weighted equally,
it is clear that there will be some additional weighting of consumer surplus above which regulators
should unambiguously favor discriminatory prices.
It is important to note, however, that our results in this subsection are based upon the
assumption that the consumer reservation price imposes no effective limit on firms’ choice of
prices as given by equations (17) and (19). We now examine the effect of relaxing this
assumption.
5.2 Welfare Comparisons: Binding Consumer Reservation Price
It will emerge below that if the consumer reservation price is binding, welfare comparisons
of the two pricing policies will be affected by market length. As a result, assume that the market is
of length L. Given the entry process described in section 3, the free-entry number of entrants is
now equal to:
(20a)
( ) ( )
( )
( )


































We know that the highest mill price any firm will wish to charge is v - L/2n and that the
highest uniform delivered price that can be charged is v. Also, an important implication of
subsection 5.1 is that, no matter the degree of spatial contestability, the discount factor  $ d f  above                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
19
which the consumer reservation price is binding is lower with mill pricing than with discriminatory
pricing. We take advantage of these two properties in this section.  Our discussion turns the
analysis of the previous section on its head to an extent by seeking to answer the following
questions:
(i) Under what circumstances will all consumers be worse off with discriminatory pricing as
compared to mill pricing and how is this affected by the degree of spatial contestability?
For this to be the case it must be that the uniform delivered price is exactly equal to the
consumer reservation price v, since we know that the maximum delivered price with mill pricing is
v and this applies to a zero measure of consumers.  So what does the critical discount factor  d d ˆ
have to be for a uniform delivered price  ( ) v u d
a
i = d ˆ ~  to be sustainable as an SPE? We can then
show how this critical discount factor is affected by market size, the consumer reservation price
and the firms’ set-up costs.
(ii) Under what circumstances will consumers on average be worse off with discriminatory
pricing and how is this affected by the degree of spatial contestability?
For this to be the case the uniform delivered price must be greater than v - L/4n. So above
what discount factor will a uniform delivered price of v - L/4n be sustainable as an SPE? Again,
we can investigate how is this discount factor is affected by market size, the consumer reservation
price and the firms’ set-up costs.
(iii) Under what circumstances will firms either individually or on aggregate benefit from price
deregulation and how is this affected by the degree of spatial contestability?
The approach we adopt is straightforward. Equation (19) identifies the maximum uniform
delivered price that is sustainable as an SPE for a given discount factor. Inverting this equation,
therefore, gives us the lowest discount factor for which a particular uniform delivered price is
sustainable as an SPE. Assume that the uniform delivered price is k/n < v for some parameter k >
1. From equation (19), the discount factor  ( ) $ d k d  for which the uniform delivered price
( ) ( )
~ $ ui
a
d d k  equals k n is:
(21) ( ) ( )
( )
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It follows immediately from (21) that  ( ) ¶d k ¶k $
d ‡ 0.  In other words, the critical discount factor
( ) $ d k d  is increasing in k.
Consider first the critical discount factor above which all consumers will be worse off with
discriminatory pricing. We have already noted that for this to be the case  ( ) ( )
~ $ u n v i
a
d d k k 1 1 = = ,
so that k1 = v.n, and from equation (20a) we have:
(22) k k 1 1 2 2 2
SC SNC v
v
= > = ￿ $
$ L L
where  $ v v f = .  When the consumer reservation price imposes an effective constraint on
firms’ mill prices, the critical discount factor above which all consumers are worse off with
discriminatory pricing is lower when the market is SNC than when it is SC.
For consumers in the aggregate to lose from discriminatory pricing it must be the case
that  ( ) ( ) ~ $ u n v n i
a
d d k k ‡ = - 2 4 L , which gives a lower limit on k of k2 4 = - v n . L .
Substituting from equation (20a) gives:
(23) k k 2 2 2 4 2 2 4
SC SNC v
v
= - > = ￿ - $
$ L L L L
and we obtain the same qualitative conclusion.
Note further that ¶k ¶ ¶k ¶L i i v
• • > > $ 0 0 and  (i = 1,2)
15 implying that when mill prices
are constrained by the reservation price, consumers individually and in the aggregate are more
likely to lose from discriminatory pricing if the market is “small”, the reservation price is “low”
and/or firms’ set-up costs are “high”.
For firms individually to benefit from discriminatory pricing the lower limit on k is such



























When mill prices are constrained by the reservation price, the critical discount factor above
which firms individually gain from discriminatory pricing is lower when the market is SNC than                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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when it is SC. By the same argument as in footnote 14, we have ¶k ¶ ¶k ¶L 3 3 0 0
• • > > $ v and ,
implying that when mill prices are constrained by the reservation price, firms individually are
more likely to gain from discriminatory pricing if the market is “small”, the reservation price is
“low” and/or firms’ set-up costs are “high”.
Finally, we can show that for firms in the aggregate to gain from discriminatory pricing the
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When mill prices are constrained by the reservation price, the critical discount factor above
which firms will gain from discriminatory pricing is lower when the market is SNC than when it
is SC. Once again, we have ¶k ¶ ¶k ¶L 4 4 0 0
• • > > $ v and , implying that when mill prices are
constrained by the reservation price, firms in the aggregate are more likely to gain from
discriminatory pricing if the market is “small”, the reservation price is “low” and/or firms’ set-
up costs are “high”.
These results take us back more nearly to those presented in Norman and Thisse for the
one-shot price subgame. When mill prices are constrained by the consumer reservation price,
there will be a degree of price flexibility above which consumers will lose and producers will
benefit from discriminatory pricing. The degree of price flexibility necessary for this to be the case
is lower if the market is SNC than if it is SC, reflecting the stronger entry-deterring nature of
SNC.
We are also brought back to our question in the introduction of whether there is a
potential role for the regulatory authorities in influencing the degree of price flexibility. Equations
(17) and (19) indicate that, no matter the allowable pricing policy, prices can be expected to be
higher the more flexible are firms' pricing decisions: since a high degree of price flexibility
translates to a high discount factor. We have shown that when the consumer reservation price
does not impose an effective constraint on firms, consumers always benefit from price
deregulation. We now see that these benefits will be even greater if price flexibility can be
                                                                                                                                                      
15  It must be the case that v > L/n and we know from (20a) that n = ￿(L/hf) where h > 1.  It follows that v/￿f
> ￿L.                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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reduced. When the consumer reservation price does impose an effective constraint, our analysis
indicates that consumers will not gain from price deregulation, particularly in more concentrated
markets, unless the degree of price flexibility is sufficiently low, where the definition of
"sufficient" can be implied from our formal analysis.
It would appear, therefore, that there are, indeed, consumer benefits to be had if price
deregulation is accompanied by policies that reduce price flexibility, perhaps by the regulator
imposing some type of minimum period within which prices cannot be changed. The intuition
behind this is familiar from the Folk Theorem. Low price flexibility reduces the effectiveness of
the punishment phase that sustains the tacitly collusive prices above the one-shot Bertrand-Nash
level and so lowers the maximum sustainable prices.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have extended our earlier analysis of the relative merits of soft and tough
price regimes to the situation in which post-entry price equilibria reflect the repeated nature of the
post-entry price subgame. We derive welfare conclusions that contrast reasonably sharply with
our one-shot analysis. If the constraint implicit in the consumer reservation price is non-binding
then aggregate consumer surplus is greater and aggregate profits are lower with discriminatory
pricing than with mill pricing no matter the degree of spatial contestability of the market. In
addition, provided that price decisions are sufficiently flexible (d > 0.601) every consumer will
benefit from price discrimination. The entry-deterring effect of discriminatory pricing is more than
offset by its pro-competitive effect.
The reason for this contrast lies in the very different constraints the two pricing policies
impose on firms’ abilities to raise their prices above the Bertrand-Nash prices. Such constraints
exist since any set of tacitly agreed prices must be sensitive to the temptation each firm has to
cheat on these prices and so must be supported by some credible punishment strategy in the event
that cheating occurs. The punishment strategy on which we have focused in this paper is the grim
trigger strategy in which, if deviation occurs, firms move to the one-shot Bertrand-Nash prices
forever.  Given the relatively aggressive entry process we have proposed, we know from our
previous analysis that at these prices firms individually and in the aggregate earn at least as great
profits with discriminatory pricing as with mill pricing. With a mill pricing policy any attempt by
one firm to undercut its rivals requires that the firm also offers the lower prices to all of its                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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existing customers. There is no such requirement with discriminatory pricing as a result of which
the gains from cheating are greater with discriminatory pricing than with mill pricing. This
combination of weaker punishment of and greater gains to cheating with a discriminatory pricing
policy leads to the consumer gains and producer losses we have noted.
If our analysis were to stop here it would appear that we could be much more sanguine
about the benefits of deregulation of firms’ pricing policies even if this were to affect market
structure in the ways we have suggested. Our analysis has also shown, however, that the
consumer reservation price has an important part to play in determining the welfare properties of
alternative pricing policies. If the reservation price effectively constrains mill prices then there
exists a degree of price flexibility above which our welfare conclusions are reversed, with firms
gaining and consumers losing from discriminatory pricing. The degree of price flexibility above
which this will apply is greater when the market is SNC; when market size is small; when the
consumer reservation price is low; and when firms’ set-up costs are high.
Each of these conditions implies that there are less likely to be benefits to consumers from
price deregulation in markets already characterized by high levels of market concentration. They
further imply a role for the regulatory authorities that has, so far as we are aware, not been
considered in the literature, primarily because most of the pre-existing analysis is static rather than
dynamic. We have shown that the discount factor has a crucial role to play in determining the
benefits that consumers are likely to derive from price deregulation. Simply put, consumers are
likely to gain more from price deregulation if the discount factor is low. The discount factor is
itself determined by the (continuous) rate of time discount, which is generally outside the control
of the regulatory authorities, and the speed with which firms can react to deviation from the tacit
agreed prices, which is conceivably within the control of the authorities. Our analysis indicates
that price deregulation is more likely to be successful if it is accompanied by policies that impose a
period over which prices cannot be changed. Interestingly, this is especially likely to be the case in
concentrated markets and these are the markets in which response speeds might be expected to be
greatest.                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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     Table 1: Welfare Comparisons
Spatial Contestability Spatial Non-Contestability
Repeated Price Game
a








i u m ~ ~  if d > 0.601
    Consumer Surplus CSf > CSd CSf > CSd
    Supernormal Profit pif > pid pif < pid
Pf > Pd Pf > Pd
    Total Surplus TSf < TSd TSf > TSd
One-Shot Price Game
    Consumer Surplus CSf < CSd CSf > CSd
    Supernormal Profit -- pif < pid
Pf < Pd
    Total Surplus TSf < TSd TSf > TSd
Notes: 
a The welfare comparisons relate to cases in which the consumer reservation











(b) n Firms with Mill Pricing; n/2 Firms with Discriminatory Pricing
Figure 1: Comparison of Price Equilibria                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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Spatial Contestability Spatial Non-Contestability
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(a)  Difference between Mill Price and Uniform Delivered Price
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(b)  Difference in Total Revenue
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(c)  Difference in Individual Firm Profits                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(d)  Difference in Aggregate Profit
Figure 2: Welfare Comparison of Non-Discriminatory
versus Discriminatory Pricing                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) Assume that firms have tacitly agreed on the mill price m/n, where m > 1.  Assume further
that a price-cutting firm charges a price (m - j)/n that just undercuts j > 1 neighboring firms. This
gives a market radius to the price-cutting firm of j/n + 1/2n and instantaneous gross profit of:
(A.1) ( )( ) p
c m j j n = - + 2 1
2 .
Instantaneous gross profit with the agreed mill price m/n is:
(A.2) p
a m n =
2 .




For such price-cutting to be unprofitable we require that:
( ) p dp d p
a b c - ‡ - 1 .
Solving for m gives the upper bound on the tacitly agreed price:
(A.4) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
~ , m j
n





+ + - +
+ -
￿





By a similar analysis, if the price-cutting firm just undercuts j + 1 neighbors the upper
bound on the mill price is:
(A.5) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
~ , m j
n






+ + - + +
+ - +
￿
1 4 5 2 1 3 2













2 .  Thus the upper bound on the mill price
is  ( ) ~ , m j
n
d
 for  ( ) ( ) [ ) d d d ˛ - j j 1 ,  for the price-cutting firm to wish just to undercut exactly j
neighbors to each side.  Inverting d(j) gives h(d) in the text.
(b) We now check that the price-cutting firm would not prefer an interior solution in which it
undercuts j neighbors to each side and takes only part of the market of the (j+1)th neighbors.
If the tacitly agreed mill price is  ( ) ~ , m j
n
d
 and the price-cutting firm charges a price c/n it
gets market radius  ( ) ( ) 1 2 + + - ~ , m j j c n d  and earns instantaneous gross profit of
( ) ( ) c m j j c n 1+ + - ~ , d  giving the optimal price:









We need merely check that  ( ) ( ) ( ) c j j n m j n d d , , + ‡ .  Substituting from (A.5) and simplifying
gives:
(A.7) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
D = + - =
+ - +
+ -







4 1 4 1
2 2 1 2
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Differentiating D with respect to d gives:
(A.8) ( )












 for j > 1.
Thus we need only evaluate D at d(j).  This gives:






It follows that the corner solution (A.5) is always the preferred method for a price-cutting
firm. n
Proof of Proposition 2:
Assume that firms have tacitly agreed on a uniform delivered price u, where u > 1/n.  A













Instantaneous gross profit with the agreed uniform delivered price is:





r dr u n = - ￿
Ł ￿ ￿
ł ￿ = -
= ￿ 2 4 1 4
0
1 2 2 .
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices give instantaneous gross profits of:
(A.12) p
b n =1 2
2 .
For price-cutting to be unprofitable we require that:
( ) p dp d p
a b c - ‡ - 1 .
Solving for u/n gives the upper bound on the tacitly agreed uniform delivered price:














The upper limit on this price is, of course, the consumer reservation price v. n
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) For a given n and provided that the reservation price is not binding, the difference between
the tacitly agreed mill and uniform delivered prices is:




1 2 1 2
1 2 2
1










For a given n d and so can be examined numerically.
D1
(ii) For a given   and provided that the reservation price is not binding, the difference between
the maximum delivered mill price with   firms and the uniform delivered price with n
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For a given n this is a function solely of the discount factor d and so can be examined numerically.
This confirms that D2 > 0 but that D2 = 0 for exactly one value of d for each value of  j|[ ]| d .  It
follows that for at least some consumers to prefer mill pricing there will have to be fewer than n/2
firms with uniform delivered pricing.                                                    n
Proof of Equations (24) and (25):
If the mill price is constrained to v - L/2n then individual firm and aggregate profit are
respectively:
(A.16)
p f f f
f f f
v n f n













where from equation (20a) we know that:
(A.17) n f f = L a




























Assume that the uniform delivered price is u/nd.  Then individual firm and aggregate profit
with uniform delivered pricing are:
(A.19)
pd d d
d d d d
u n f n













and we know that:
(A.20) n f d = L b


























Solving pd > pf and Pd > Pf  for u gives the critical values of k above which pd > pf and Pd > Pf.
Substituting for a and b in these equations gives equations (24) and (25). n                                                                                                                    Price Regulation and Tacit Collusion
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